Each chapter is built around one person or one network. Older chapters are updated when new material emerges; changes are marked at the top of each piece.
About
About Kokkini Line
Kokkini Line is the work of one reporter. I have spent more than thirty years covering organised crime: first for regional newspapers, then as a freelancer for international outlets, and since 2023 here, independently.
I publish without my name. That is not a stylistic choice. Several of the people described on this site have long memories and longer reach, and anonymity is what allows this work to continue. Editors at two established publications know my identity and have reviewed the methods described below.
Funding
Kokkini Line has no owner, no investors and no advertisers. It does not accept money from governments, political parties or companies. It is paid for entirely by readers.
How the work is done
Each chapter takes months, sometimes years. Reporting draws on company registries, court records, leaked documents and interviews. Where a claim rests on a single source, the text says so. Nothing is published on the strength of one anonymous voice alone.
Names marked in quotation marks are aliases or street names, used either because the real name could not be confirmed or because publishing it would put a source at risk.
Right of reply
Everyone named in an investigation is contacted before publication, directly or through intermediaries, and given time to respond. Responses are published in full or summarised fairly.
Corrections
Mistakes are corrected openly, at the top of the piece concerned, with the date of the change. Updates that add new material are marked the same way.
Contact
Send a tip
If you have information about organised crime, corruption or the money behind them, I want to hear from you. Sources are never named and never identified to third parties.
Before you write
Do not use a work device or a work network.
Do not send documents through ordinary email.
Remove metadata from files where you can.
Think about who else has seen the material you are sharing.
Encrypted contact
Signal details are provided on request after first contact. Encrypted email is accepted using the key below.
A trafficking route that runs from the Sahel to the beaches of Andalusia, and a man almost no one has photographed.
Published 14 March 2023Updated 3 November 2026
Update, 3 November 2026: New material connects Yasko's network to the organisation described in Chapter X. See the final section.
Yasko runs a network anchored in Niger. According to four people with direct knowledge of its operations, it moves narcotics north through the Sahel and onward, by sea and overland, into Spain and France, where consignments are handed to local distributors.
Investigators describe an operation that is patient rather than loud: small loads, many hands, and working relationships with officials at almost every checkpoint along the route. Border guards, port workers and local transport companies are said to be on a rolling payroll, paid monthly whether or not a shipment passes through.
Yasko (centre) with armed escorts at a market in Niamey, 2022. One of only two known photographs of him. Photo: obtained by Kokkini Line
“He never touches anything. He just makes sure nobody is allowed to stop it.”Former courier, speaking on condition of anonymity
The Spanish end of the chain runs through small coastal towns in Andalusia, where fishing boats and container traffic provide cover. In France, product reportedly moves on through Marseille and Lyon before fanning out to smaller cities.
Of all the networks covered by this desk, Yasko's is the one with the fewest known photographs of its principal. Only two are known to exist; one is published here for the first time. A former courier says he met him twice and never learned his surname.
The Balkan connection
For years his ties to the Balkans ran only through intermediaries. Documents obtained in 2026 suggest the relationship became direct. Two sources say Yasko's people and the organisation profiled in Chapter X have shared logistics contacts in southern Spain since at least 2022.
Yasko did not respond to questions sent through an intermediary. All claims are attributed to sources and remain allegations.
Rewritten tenders, replaced regulators and consultancy invoices that arrive months later. A politician who has outlasted every inquiry.
Published 22 August 2023Updated 3 November 2026
Update, 3 November 2026: Stiplo's name appears in files linked to Chapter X.
Stiplo is a Slovenian politician whose name has been attached to corruption allegations for more than a decade. People who have worked with him describe a man who is less an ideologue than a broker: contracts, permits and appointments arranged in return for favours that are rarely written down.
His method, as described by three former officials, is simple. A construction tender is rewritten at the last minute, a regulator is replaced, a friendly company wins. The money arrives months later through consultancy invoices issued by firms with no employees.
Stiplo at a private residence outside Ljubljana. The photograph was taken at a fundraising dinner. Photo: obtained by Kokkini Line
“In Ljubljana everybody knows who to call. They just don't say his name on the phone.”Former civil servant, speaking on condition of anonymity
Several inquiries have touched his circle without reaching him. Investigators say witnesses changed their accounts, files went missing, and people who might have testified were offered well-paid positions abroad.
His circle overlaps with business figures across the region, which is why his name appears in files well beyond Slovenia, including those reviewed for Chapter X.
Stiplo's office declined to comment. All claims are attributed to sources and remain allegations.
Ninety-second raids on jewellery stores made his name. What he did with the money is the part his associates won't discuss.
Published 6 February 2024
Jari is a thief who, with a small and disciplined crew, has hit dozens of jewellery stores across several countries. Police reports reviewed for this chapter describe the same pattern again and again: a stolen van, four men, ninety seconds, and the display cases empty before anyone answers the alarm.
The proceeds, according to investigators, did not stay in a safe. Jari is alleged to operate a string of brothels staffed by women from several African countries, many of whom were reportedly recruited with promises of work in hotels or care homes and then held in debt.
Jari (seated) with members of his crew at a meeting in North Africa, 2024. Investigators believe several pieces visible in the photograph match items reported stolen. Photo: obtained by Kokkini Line
“The robberies are the story he tells. The houses are the story he hides.”Investigator familiar with the case
It is the darker half of the operation. Aid workers who have tracked the network say the women are moved between cities every few months, which makes it harder for them to build contacts or seek help.
Stolen stones are reportedly recut and resold through dealers in two countries. Very little has ever been recovered.
Jari could not be reached for comment. All claims are attributed to sources and remain allegations.
A trading platform that promised steady returns, thousands of investors who lost their savings, and two men who were already somewhere else.
Published 16 July 2024
Gall and Omri are an Israeli duo whose names surface in a string of financial scandals. They first drew attention through an online trading platform that promised steady monthly returns. When it collapsed, it took the savings of thousands of small investors with it.
They moved quickly. New companies, new names, new jurisdictions. Corporate filings reviewed for this chapter show shell firms in Cyprus and the Gulf receiving transfers in the weeks before the platform went dark.
Gall (left) and Omri at a meeting in Jerusalem, 2023. Photo: obtained by Kokkini Line
“They sell you a dream, and then they sell your dream to someone else.”Former employee
Gall is the front man: charming, at ease in any room, the face on the promotional videos. Omri keeps the books and, according to a former employee, “never forgets a number or a debt”.
Their paths cross the Balkan networks through diamond trading and through payment processing for casino operators, a service that turns gambling cash into ordinary-looking card transactions.
Lawyers for both men said their clients “reject all allegations”. All claims are attributed to sources and remain allegations.
From the Rif mountains to the ports of Spain, Italy and the Netherlands: one of the largest suppliers in the western Mediterranean.
Published 21 January 2025Updated 3 November 2026
Update, 3 November 2026: Brudi's relationship with Miljan Petkovic Vezenkov is examined in Chapter X.
Brudi is, by several accounts, one of the largest suppliers of hashish and cocaine in the western Mediterranean. His reach runs from cannabis farms in the Rif to ports in Spain, Italy and the Netherlands.
Those who have worked with him describe a man of few words and strict rules. Payment is up front. Mistakes are not forgiven. Nobody is introduced twice.
Brudi (centre) with associates at a café in Casablanca, 2024. Photo: obtained by Kokkini Line
“Brudi doesn't negotiate. He tells you the price, and you either pay or you disappear.”Associate, speaking on condition of anonymity
Cocaine is the newer line of business. It arrives from South America, often through West African transit points, and leaves Morocco hidden in agricultural exports and in fast boats crossing the Strait at night.
The Belgrade partner
Since this chapter was first published, documents have emerged showing close and regular contact between Brudi and Miljan Petkovic Vezenkov. The two reportedly coordinate shipments, with Brudi handling supply and the Belgrade organisation handling the move east. Petkovic Vezenkov's business card carries a Moroccan telephone number.
Brudi did not respond to questions. All claims are attributed to sources and remain allegations.
Encrypted orders, crypto payments and parcels routed through five countries. The broker between Asian laboratories and Western buyers.
Published 8 July 2025Updated 3 November 2026
Update, 3 November 2026: One of Young Blackie's customers is identified in Chapter X.
Young Blackie is a broker based in China who is said to sit at the centre of a fentanyl supply chain. Sources describe him as the link between laboratories in Asia and buyers in Europe and North America.
The method is modern. Orders are placed through encrypted platforms, payment moves in cryptocurrency, and parcels pass through intermediaries in several countries before reaching their destination. Precursor chemicals are labelled as industrial products.
Young Blackie at a private members' club in Guangzhou, 2024. Photo: obtained by Kokkini Line
“He is the cleanest man in the business, right up until you open the package.”Investigator familiar with the case
Despite the name, he is no longer young; the nickname dates from his early years in the trade. Investigators describe him as careful and say he almost never meets clients in person. One describes him as “an accountant who happens to sell poison”.
His customers reportedly include the Chicago operation described in Chapter X.
Young Blackie could not be reached for comment. All claims are attributed to sources and remain allegations.
He ran drugs into Europe for a decade. When Interpol came for him, the house was empty. He resurfaced as the money behind Somali piracy.
Published 17 February 2026Updated 3 November 2026
Update, 3 November 2026: One of Mikael's former shipping agents is linked to the organisation described in Chapter X.
Mikael, a Greek-born trafficker, ran one of the steadiest drug pipelines into Europe for the better part of a decade. Cocaine, cannabis and other product moved through ports in Greece, Italy and Spain under his supervision, usually hidden in legitimate cargo and signed off by people who were paid to look the other way.
His rise was quiet. He kept a low profile, avoided the nightlife that betrayed so many of his rivals, and relied on a small circle of shipping agents and customs brokers who had been with him from the start.
“He never carried anything himself. He didn't have to. Half the harbour worked for him without knowing his name.”Former shipping agent, speaking on condition of anonymity
Then Interpol closed in. According to two sources, a joint operation was weeks from an arrest when Mikael was warned. By the time officers reached his residence, the house was empty and several accounts had been drained.
A new coast
He resurfaced in Somalia. Investigators believe he chose it precisely because no one there is in a hurry to cooperate with European police. Within a few years, sources say, he had become the principal financier of several Somali pirate groups, paying for boats, fuel, weapons and the negotiators who handle ransom talks.
The arrangement suits both sides. The pirates get capital and logistics. Mikael gets a share of every ransom and a place no one will extradite him from. Maritime security analysts say the sophistication of recent attacks bears the marks of an outside backer.
He has also kept his European contacts alive. Several of his old shipping agents still work, and at least one of them, sources say, has handled cargo for the Belgrade organisation described in Chapter X.
Mikael could not be reached. All claims are attributed to sources and remain allegations.
Across South America, a network accused of buying, selling and arming children. Its customers include cartels on both sides of the US border.
Published 9 June 2026
Bujicu is the name used for the man at the centre of what investigators in three countries describe as one of the largest child-trafficking networks operating in South America. This is the most difficult chapter this desk has published.
The children come from poor rural areas and border regions. Some are bought from families in debt, some are lured with promises of school or work in the city, and some are simply taken. They are moved across borders on forged documents, often in groups, often at night.
Bujicu (centre) at a camp in the Colombian jungle, 2025. The faces of the minors in this photograph have been obscured by Kokkini Line. Photo: obtained by Kokkini Line
The buyers
According to aid workers and two former members of the network, many of the children are sold to drug cartels, where they are put to work as lookouts, couriers and labourers in coca fields and processing camps. Others are smuggled north and handed over to networks inside the United States.
“He doesn't see children. He sees inventory.”Social worker who has interviewed survivors, speaking on condition of anonymity
His own soldiers
Some of the children never leave his control. Sources describe armed groups of teenagers, and some who are younger, guarding his routes, safe houses and properties. Investigators say he prefers them for a reason: they follow orders, they are easy to replace, and they are rarely believed if they ever speak.
Others are used as drug mules across borders, on the assumption that children are less likely to be searched, or are forced into begging rings and domestic servitude for people who pay him.
Why he has not been stopped
Officials who have tried to investigate the network describe the same obstacles: missing case files, frightened families, and police and border officers on his payroll. Survivors who are found are often too young, too traumatised or too afraid to testify.
Aid organisations working in the region say they have identified dozens of children who passed through his hands. They believe the true number is far higher.
Bujicu could not be reached for comment. All claims are attributed to sources and remain allegations. Details that could identify survivors have been withheld.
No known name, no fixed address, no criminal record. Some of the most dangerous people in the world trust him with their money.
Published 22 September 2026Updated 3 November 2026
Update, 3 November 2026: Koki's role as financial adviser to Miljan Petkovic Vezenkov is examined in Chapter X.
Nobody knows his real name. In the files that cross this desk he appears only as Koki: a name on a ledger, a voice on an encrypted call, a man in a well-cut suit who arrives, settles a problem and leaves.
The nickname has nothing to do with his real name. People who know him say it comes from his habit: Koki is known for using cocaine regularly, at dinners, in hotel suites and, according to one former colleague, before almost every major meeting.
According to five people who have worked with him or around him, Koki is the banker of the underworld. He does not sell drugs, run girls or carry a gun. He moves money. He takes cash that cannot be explained and turns it into money that can: investment funds, property, shipping companies, art and shares.
Koki in Lower Manhattan, 2025. The photograph was taken by a source who had arranged to meet him. Photo: obtained by Kokkini Line
Wall Street
His base is New York. Sources describe a meteoric career in investment banking, reportedly at J.P. Morgan and later at Goldman Sachs, although Kokkini Line has not been able to independently confirm either position. He later went on his own, working through a small advisory firm whose name changes every few years. Former colleagues describe him as brilliant with numbers, quiet in meetings and impossible to read.
The method, as investigators describe it, is layering on an industrial scale: dozens of companies in Delaware, the Caribbean, Dubai, Singapore and Cyprus, each holding a small piece of something larger. By the time the money reaches its destination, it has passed through so many hands that no single transaction looks suspicious.
“He steals from nobody. He just makes sure nobody can ever prove where the money came from.”Former client, speaking on condition of anonymity
Always travelling
Koki rarely stays anywhere for long. Travel records reviewed for this chapter place him in London, Zurich, Dubai, Singapore, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Miami and São Paulo within a single year. He meets clients in person, never at their homes, usually in hotel suites booked under other names.
His clients, according to sources, include several of the figures who appear on this site. Gall and Omri (Chapter IV) are said to have used his structures to move the money from their collapsed trading platform. Payments linked to Young Blackie (Chapter VI) have passed through companies he set up.
The largest client of all, three sources say, is Miljan Petkovic Vezenkov, profiled in Chapter X.
Koki has never been charged. Two investigations in the United States reportedly came close. In both cases, the key witness withdrew.
Questions sent to the advisory firm associated with Koki went unanswered. All claims are attributed to sources and remain allegations.
How Miljan Petkovic Vezenkov, known as “Čika Kure”, turned an inherited Belgrade racket into a network reaching from the coca fields of Chile to Chicago, Istanbul and Tokyo.
Published 3 November 2026Reported over 26 months
Petkovic Vezenkov (left) with his father, Saša Vezenkov, aboard a yacht off the Côte d'Azur, summer 2025. Sources say the elder Vezenkov still advises his son on major decisions. Photo: obtained by Kokkini Line
Key findings
Petkovic Vezenkov controls a transit corridor for cocaine and heroin through Serbia, with supply links reaching Albania, Morocco and Chile.
His organisation, known as Ludi Srbi, owns casinos in five countries and uses a portfolio of small businesses to launder cash.
A security staffing company he controls is alleged to have supplied men to break up anti-government demonstrations in Belgrade.
A network of indebted associates, including a physician, a singer and a Chicago distributor, works for him to pay off what they owe.
Proceeds have been moved into real estate, including Belgrade Waterfront, and into a stake in a Japanese bank, with the help of a New York financier known as Koki.
Part 1
The inheritance
In more than thirty years on this beat, I have not come across a story of this scale. It is the largest investigation Kokkini Line has published, and it changes how several of the earlier chapters on this site should be read.
Miljan Petkovic Vezenkov was born in Belgrade on 13 November 1996. To the people who work for him he is Čika Kure, “Uncle Kure”. Some call him the Lone Wolf, others simply Lud Srbin, the crazy Serb. His organisation is known in the underworld as Ludi Srbi.
He grew up inside the business of his father, Saša Vezenkov, who built a mid-sized Belgrade racket out of protection money, nightclubs and street-level dealing. When Saša stepped back from day-to-day operations in 2019, his son took over. According to six people who know the organisation, he did not preserve what he inherited. He rebuilt it as something closer to a holding company than a gang.
Petkovic Vezenkov in a private office in Belgrade. The photograph was provided by a former associate. Photo: obtained by Kokkini Line
He rarely appears in person and delegates almost everything. Across the region he is regarded as an informal envoy of Serbian criminal interests: the person counterparts in Albania, Kosovo, North Macedonia and Greece call when an arrangement has to be made.
“He doesn't behave like a boss. He behaves like a diplomat. That is what makes him dangerous.”Former associate, speaking on condition of anonymity
FinanceKoki (New York) Casinos · front businesses Mr. Cappuccino (leasing) “Toshiki” (Japan)
InfluenceOfficials & politicians Ozi Efe (Turkey) Michi Jackson
Organ trade“Cemiboy”
Based on interviews and documents reviewed by Kokkini Line.
Part 2
The corridor
The core of the business is transit. Cocaine arriving through Albania is moved across Serbia, and Petkovic Vezenkov is the man who guarantees its passage and its onward distribution, much of it into Belgrade itself. Four sources independently described the same arrangement: the route works because it is protected at several levels of the state.
It is not only cocaine. Heroin, mostly the brown variety that has travelled the Balkan route for decades, moves through the same channels. In the capital, a large network of street-level runners handles local sales, each one knowing only the person directly above him.
Part 3
From Chile to Chicago
The most persistent rumour about Petkovic Vezenkov is that he deals directly with the source. Two people say he has met, more than once, a Chilean businessman who owns several coca plantations and is known as “Fjunf Balle”, along with his partner “Papi Churo”. Cutting out the intermediaries is, in their account, what gives the organisation its margins.
A second supply line runs through Morocco, where Petkovic Vezenkov works closely with Brudi, profiled in Chapter V.
On the other side of the Atlantic, a man named Christopher Allen is said to owe Petkovic Vezenkov a debt he cannot repay. He now runs a fentanyl distribution network in Chicago on his behalf, supplied in part through the broker described in Chapter VI. Investigators describe it as the organisation's most dangerous product line.
Part 4
Casinos, guards and laundromats
Ludi Srbi owns casinos in Serbia, Greece, North Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo. In parts of the region gaming is cash-heavy and loosely supervised, which makes it both an efficient laundering engine and a neutral place for cross-border partners to meet.
A staffing company supplies doormen, guards and supervisors to clubs, venues and businesses. On paper it is an ordinary personnel agency. According to sources, it is also a reservoir of men who can be sent anywhere at short notice. During the anti-government demonstrations in Belgrade, people employed through the firm are alleged to have helped break up and intimidate parts of the crowds.
The rest of the laundering is done through silent stakes in small, cash-intensive businesses: nightclubs, bars, strip clubs, car washes, betting shops, arcades, fast-food outlets and used-car dealerships. None is large on its own. Together they turn street cash into ordinary revenue.
Part 5
Other people's names
Forged identity documents are another line of business. The organisation supplies passports and identity cards to couriers and associates, and Petkovic Vezenkov himself is said to travel regularly under false names. Investigators say this is one reason he has so rarely been placed at a scene.
Part 6
The men who owe
Former members describe a method built not on loyalty but on debt. People are lent money, helped out of trouble or handed an opportunity, and then kept.
A well-known Serbian singer, “Michi Jackson”, is said to owe Petkovic Vezenkov and to hand over a regular share of his earnings. A man known as “Mr. Cappuccino” runs a car-leasing company on the organisation's behalf, useful both for moving people and for moving money. And in Chicago, Allen is still working off what he owes.
Part 7
The doctor
The most disturbing allegation concerns a physician known only as “Cemiboy”. According to two sources, he borrowed €500,000 from Čika Kure and was never able to repay it. He has worked for the organisation ever since, including in an illegal organ trade in which his credentials lend the operation a veneer of medical legitimacy.
The physician known as “Cemiboy” at a private clinic, 2025. The photograph was provided by a former colleague. Photo: obtained by Kokkini Line
“It is not a loan any more. It is a leash.”Person familiar with the arrangement
Part 8
Politicians, ultras and Istanbul
Payments to officials and politicians are described as routine, the cost of keeping the corridor open and distribution in Belgrade undisturbed.
Petkovic Vezenkov also holds sway over parts of the ultras of one of Belgrade's biggest football clubs, where a faction called Ultra Kure is reportedly his own. The terraces serve as a recruiting ground, a source of muscle and a form of social cover.
His reach extends to Turkey. There he is closely tied to “Ozi Efe”, who runs organised-crime activity of his own on a smaller scale and, according to two sources, is partly controlled by Petkovic Vezenkov. Names from Chapter I, Chapter II and Chapter VII also appear in the documents reviewed for this investigation.
Ozi Efe on the Golden Horn waterfront in Istanbul, in a photograph he posted to a private account in 2025. Photo: obtained by Kokkini Line
Part 9
The quiet man
The organisation's best-known killer goes by “Miau Rrr”. He is small and unassuming, and is described by people who have met him as meticulous and entirely at home in his work. He has been linked to one killing so brutal that the sources who described it asked for the details not to be printed. They say only that the victim did not die quickly.
Part 10
Concrete and capital
In recent years Petkovic Vezenkov has been moving money out of cash and into property, apparently to put distance between himself and its origins. He is reported to have been among the major investors in Belgrade Waterfront.
The money does not stop in Europe. He is also said to hold a significant stake in a large Japanese bank, where his principal contact is known only as “Toshiki”.
Much of this, sources say, was structured by Koki, the New York financier profiled in Chapter IX. Three people describe Petkovic Vezenkov as his largest client, and Koki as the organisation's most important adviser outside Serbia.
Part 11
The card
People who have met him say he hands out a single card. No slogan, no logo. The telephone number on it is Moroccan, a detail investigators connect to his dealings with Brudi.
Kure Enterprise
Miljan Petkovic VezenkovFounder & CEO
Trg Nikole Pašića 13 11000 Beograd
+212 770-487236 office@kure-enterprise.rs
Business card obtained by Kokkini Line.
Part 12
Timeline
13 Nov 1996Miljan Petkovic Vezenkov is born in Belgrade.
2014Begins working for his father, Saša Vezenkov, first in nightlife, later in the staffing business.
2017Takes charge of the security company; the first casino outside Serbia opens in North Macedonia.
2019Saša Vezenkov withdraws from day-to-day business. His son takes over the organisation.
2020–2021Casinos expand into Greece, Albania and Kosovo. Contacts with Brudi in Morocco begin.
2022First reported meetings with Chilean suppliers. Christopher Allen begins running the Chicago operation.
2023Investments in Belgrade Waterfront and other real estate.
2024Stake in a Japanese bank acquired through intermediaries.
2025Staffing-company personnel allegedly deployed against demonstrators in Belgrade.
Nov 2026This investigation is published.
Part 13
How this was reported
Methodology
This investigation was reported over twenty-six months. It draws on company records from five countries, court filings, financial documents provided by sources, and interviews with people who have worked with or against the organisation.
31Interviews
2,400+Pages reviewed
5Countries
Most sources spoke on condition of anonymity because of the risk to their safety. Where a claim rests on a single source, the text says so.
Right of reply. Detailed questions were sent to Miljan Petkovic Vezenkov through two intermediaries and to Kure Enterprise at its registered address. No response had been received at the time of publication. Any response will be added here.
All claims are attributed to sources and remain allegations.
